THEORETICAL WAR
War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale... an act
of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.
Violence arms itself with the inventions of art and science in order
to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible
and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law,
accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence,
that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without
the conception of states and law), is therefore the means; the compulsory
submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order
to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed; and this
is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory...
Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method
of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed,
and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However
plausible this may appear, still it is an error that must be extirpated;
for in such dangerous things as war, the errors that proceed from
a spirit of benevolence are just the worst. As the use of physical
power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation
of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly,
without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority
if his adversary does not act likewise
This is the way in which the matter must be viewed; and it is to
no purpose, and even acting against one's own interest, to turn
away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair, because
the coarseness of its elements excites repugnance.
If the wars of civilized people are less cruel and destructive than
those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition
both of states in themselves and in their relations to each other.
Out of this social condition and its relations war arises, and by
it war is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified. But
these things do not belong to war itself; they are only given conditions;
and to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of
moderation would be an absurdity.
Amongst savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst
civilized nations those emanating from the understanding, have the
predominance; but this difference is not inherent in a state of
barbarism and in a state of culture in themselves, it arises from
attendant circumstances, existing institutions, etc., and therefore
is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails
in the majority. In short, even the most civilized nations may burn
with passionate hatred of each other.
If war is an act of force, it belongs necessarily also to
the feelings. If it does not originate in the feelings, it reacts
more or less upon them, and this more or less depends not on the
degree of civilization, but upon the importance and duration of
the interests involved.
Therefore, if we find civilized nations do not put their prisoners
to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because
their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of
carrying on war, and has taught them more effectual means of applying
force than these rude acts of mere instinct. The invention of gunpowder,
the constant progress of improvements in the construction of firearms
are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary
which lies at the bottom of the conception of war, is in no way
changed or modified through the progress of civilization.
...If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts
to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of
two factors that cannot be separated -- namely, the sum of available
means and the strength of the will
.
WAR ACTUALLY, ITS POLITICAL OBJECT
Reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop short of
an extreme
but everything takes a different form when we pass
from abstractions to reality. In [abstractions] everything must
be subject to optimism, and we must imagine the one side as well
as the other, striving after perfection and even attaining it. Will
this ever take place in reality? It will if
1) War becomes a completely isolated act, which
arises suddenly and is in no way connected with the previous history
of the states;
2) If it is limited to a single solution, or to several simultaneous
solutions;
3) If it contains within itself the solution perfect and complete,
free from any reaction upon it, through a calculation beforehand
of the political situation which will follow from it.
But
war is never an isolated act
It does
not consist of a single instantaneous blow
The result in war
is never absolute
even the final decision of a whole war is
not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered state often
sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times
by means of political combinations. How much this also must modify
the degree of tension and the vigor of the efforts made is evident
in itself.
The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the
adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped
the place of [the political] end or object... If the whole consideration
is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations,
then the political object, being the original motive, must be an
essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand
from our opponent, the smaller it may be expected will be the means
of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his are, the
smaller will be required of us. Further, the smaller our political
object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily
shall we be induced to give it up altogether.
...[T]he political object, as the original motive of the war, will
be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force,
and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself;
but it is so in relation to both the belligerent states, because
we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. One
and the same political object may produce totally different effects
upon different people, or even upon the same people at different
times; we can, therefore, only admit the political object as the
measure, by considering it in its effects upon those masses which
it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also
comes into consideration. It is easy to see that thus the result
may be very different according as these masses are animated with
a spirit which will infuse vigor into the action or otherwise. It
is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two
states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce
an effect quite disproportionate, in fact, a perfect explosion...
CHANCE AND COURAGE IN WAR
We see from the foregoing how much the objective nature of war makes
it a calculation of probabilities... There is no human affair which
stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance
as war. But along with chance, the accidental, and along with it
good luck, occupy a great place in war.
If we now take a look at the subjective nature of
war, that is, at those powers with which it is carried on, it will
appear to us still more like a game. The element in which the operations
of war are carried on is danger; but which of all the moral qualities
is the first in danger? Courage.
...Theory must also take into account the human element; it must
accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness. The art
of war has to deal with living and with moral forces; the consequence
of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive.
There is therefore everywhere a margin for the accidental; and just
as much in the greatest things as in the smallest. As there is room
for this accidental on the one hand, so on the other there must
be courage and self-reliance in proportion to the room left. If
these qualities are forthcoming in a high degree, the margin left
may likewise be great. Courage and self reliance are therefore principles
quite essential to war; consequently theory must only set up such
rules as allow ample scope for all degrees and varieties of these
necessary and noblest of military virtues. In daring there may still
be wisdom also, and prudence as well...
A MORE PARTICULAR DEFINITION OF WAR
The war of a community -- of whole nations and particularly
of civilized nations -- always starts from a political condition,
and is called forth by a political motive. It is therefore a political
act. Now if it was a perfect, unrestrained and absolute expression
of force, as we had to deduce it from its mere conception, then
the moment it is called forth by political policy it would step
into the place of politics, and as something quite independent of
it would set it aside, and only follow its own laws
But it is not so, and the idea is radically false. War in the real
world, as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which expends
itself at one single discharge... but always lasting long enough
to admit of influence being exerted on it in its course, so as to
give it this or that direction, in short to be subject to the will
of a guiding intelligence.
Now if we reflect that war has its root in a political object, then
naturally this original motive that called it into existence should
also continue the first and highest consideration in the conduct
of it. Still the political object is no despotic lawgiver on that
account; it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means,
and through that is often completely changed, but it always remains
that which has a prior right to consideration. Politics therefore
is interwoven with the whole action of war, and must exercise a
continuous influence upon it as far as the nature of the forces
exploding in it will permit.
War is a mere continuation of politics by other means...We see,
therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real
political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying
out of the same by other means.
The political view is the
object, war is the means, and the means must always include the
object in our conception.
The greater and more powerful the motives of a war, the more it
affects the whole existence of a people, the more violent the excitement
which precedes the war, by so much the nearer will the war approach
to its abstract form, so much the more will it be directed to the
destruction of the enemy, so much nearer will the military and political
ends coincide, so much more purely military and less political the
war appears to be
.
The weaker the motives and the tensions, so much less will the natural
direction of the military element -- that is, force -- be coincident
with the direction which the political element indicates; so much
the more must therefore the war become diverted from its natural
direction, the political object diverge from the aim of an ideal
war, and the war appear to become political
.[All acts of war]
may all be regarded as political acts.
Although it is true that in... [ideal] war the political element
seems almost to disappear, whilst in another kind it occupies a
very prominent place, we may still affirm that the one is as political
as the other...
...[U]nder all circumstances war is to be regarded not as an independent
thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this
point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition
to all military history. This is the only means of unlocking the
great book and making it intelligible. Secondly, just this view
shows us how wars must differ in character according to the nature
of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed.
Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment
which the statesman and general exercises is rightly to understand
in this respect the war in which he engages, not to take it for
something, or to wish to make of it something which, by the nature
of its relations, it is impossible for it to be.
War is, therefore, not only a true chameleon, because it changes
its nature in some degree in each particular case, but it is also,
as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are
in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of
its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as
blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make
it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of
a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.
The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second
more the general and his army; the third more the Government. The
passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence
in the peoples. The range which the display of courage and talents
shall get in the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on
the particular characteristics of the general and his army; but
the political objects belong to the Government alone
THE ENDS AND MEANS OF WAR
If we keep once more to the pure conception of war,
then we must say that its political object properly lies out of
its province, for if war is an act of violence to compel the enemy
to fulfill our will, then in every case all depends on our overthrowing
the enemy...
War does not, [however], always require to be fought
out until one party is overthrown; and we may suppose that, when
the motives and passions are slight, a weak probability will suffice
to move that side to which [war] is unfavorable to give way. Now,
were the other side convinced of this beforehand, it is natural
that it would strive for this probability only, instead of first
trying and making the detour of a total destruction of the enemy's
army.
As war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated
over by the political object, therefore the value of that object
determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased.
This will be the case, not only as regards extent, but also as regards
duration. As soon, therefore, as the required outlay becomes so
great that the political object is no longer equal in value, the
object must be given up, and peace will be the result.
But now we come upon a peculiar means of influencing
the probability of the result without destroying the enemy's army,
namely, upon the expeditions which have a direct connection with
political views. If there are any enterprises which are particularly
likely to break up the enemy's alliances or make them inoperative,
to gain new alliances for ourselves, to raise political powers in
our own favor, etc., etc., then it is easy to conceive how much
these may increase the probability of success, and become a shorter
way towards our aim than the routing of the enemy's army.
These are the circumstances in general connected
with the aim that we have to pursue in war; let us now turn to the
means.
There is only one single means, it is the Fight.
...Now, in the combat all the action is directed to
the destruction of the enemy, or rather of his fighting powers,
for this lies in the conception of combat. The destruction of the
enemy's fighting power is, therefore, always the means to attain
the object of the combat.
This object may likewise be the mere destruction of
the enemy's armed force; but that is not by any means necessary,
and it may be something quite different. Whenever...the defeat of
the enemy is not the only means to attain the political object,
whenever there are other objects which may be pursued, as the aim
in a war, then it follows of itself that such other objects may
become the object of particular acts of warfare, and, therefore,
also the object of combats.
But even those combats which, as subordinate acts, are in the strict
sense devoted to the destruction of the enemy's fighting force,
need not have that destruction itself as their first object.
Against the far superior worth which the destruction
of the enemy's armed force has over all other means, stands the
expense and risk of this means, and it is only to avoid these that
any other means are taken...
Other methods are[...] less costly when they succeed,
less dangerous when they fail; but in this is necessarily lodged
the condition that they are only opposed to similar ones, that is,
that the enemy acts on the same principle; for if the enemy should
choose the way of a great decision by arms, our means must on that
account be changed against our will, in order to correspond with
his
...The bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for
the destruction of the enemy's force, is the firstborn son of war.
If when political objects are unimportant, motives weak, the excitement
of forces small, a cautious commander tries in all kinds of ways,
without great crises and bloody solutions, to twist himself skillfully
into a peace through the characteristic weaknesses of his enemy
in the field and in the Cabinet, we have no right to find fault
with him, if the premises on which he acts are well founded and
justified by success; still we must require him to remember that
he only travels on forbidden tracks, where the God of War may surprise
him; that he ought always to keep his eye on the enemy, in order
that he may not have to defend himself with a dress rapier if the
enemy takes up a sharp sword
THE GENIUS FOR COMMAND
Every special calling in life, if it is to be followed with success,
requires peculiar qualifications of understanding and soul. Where
these are of a high order, and manifest themselves by extraordinary
achievements the mind to which they belong is termed genius.
War is the province of danger, and therefore courage above
all things is the first quality of a warrior.
Courage is of two kinds; first, physical courage, or courage in
presence of danger to the person: and next, moral courage, or courage
before responsibility; whether it be before the judgment seat of
external authority, or of the inner power, the conscience...
Courage before danger to the person, again, is of two kinds. First,
it may be indifference to danger, whether proceeding from the organism
of the individual, contempt of death, or habit: in any of these
cases it is to be regarded as a permanent condition. Secondly, courage
may proceed from positive motives; such as personal pride, patriotism,
and enthusiasm of any kind. In this case courage is not so much
a normal condition as an impulse.
We may conceive that the two kinds act differently. The first kind
is more certain, because it has become a second nature, never forsakes
the man: the second often leads him further. In the first there
is more of firmness, in the second of boldness. The first leaves
the judgment cooler, the second raises its power at times, but often
bewilders it. The two combined make up the most perfect kind of
courage.
War is the province of physical exertion and suffering. In order
not to be completely overcome by them, a certain strength of body
and mind is required, which, either natural or acquired, produces
indifference to them. With these qualifications under the guidance
of simply a sound understanding, a man is at once a proper instrument
for war; and these are the qualifications so generally to be met
with amongst wild and half-civilized tribes.
If we go further in the demands which war makes on
its votaries, then we find the powers of the understanding predominating.
War is the province of uncertainty: three-fourths of those things
upon which action in war must be calculated, are hidden more or
less in the clouds of great uncertainty. Here, then, above all a
fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the truth
by the tact of its judgment
From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, this
continual interposition of chance, the actor in war constantly finds
things different to his expectations; and this cannot fail to have
an influence on his plans
Now, if it is to get safely through
this perpetual conflict with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable:
in the first place an understanding which, even in the midst of
this intense obscurity, is not without some traces of inner light,
which lead to the truth, and then the courage to follow this faint
light...
Resolution is an act of courage in single instances, and if it becomes
a characteristic trait, it is a habit of the mind. But here we do
not mean courage in face of bodily danger, but in face of responsibility,
therefore to a certain extent against moral danger.
We have
assigned to resolution the office of removing the torments of doubt,
and the dangers of delay, when there are no sufficient motives for
guidance.
This resolution now, which overcomes the state of doubting, can
only be called forth by the intellect and in fact by a peculiar
tendency of the same. We maintain that the mere union of a superior
understanding and the necessary feelings are not sufficient to make
up resolution. There are persons who possess the keenest perception
for the most difficult problems, who are also not fearful of responsibility,
and yet in cases of difficulty cannot come to a resolution. Their
courage and their sagacity operate independently of each other,
do not give each other a hand, and on that account do not produce
resolution as a result. The forerunner of resolution is an act of
the mind making evident the necessity of venturing, and thus influencing
the will. This quite peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers
every other fear in man by the fear of wavering or doubting, is
what makes up resolution in strong minds
From the overall view and resolution, we are naturally led to speak
of its kindred quality, presence of mind, which in a region of the
unexpected like war must act a great part, for [war] is indeed nothing
but a great conquest over the unexpected
If we take a general
view of the four elements composing the atmosphere in which war
moves, of danger, physical efforts, uncertainty, and chance, it
is easy to conceive that a great force of mind and understanding
are requisite to be able to make way with safety and success amongst
such opposing elements, a force which, according to the different
modifications arising out of circumstances, we find termed by military
writers and annalists as energy, firmness, staunchness, strength
of mind and character. All these manifestations of the heroic nature
might be regarded as one and the same power of volition, modified
according to circumstances; but nearly related as these things are
to each other, still they are not one and the same...
As long as a troop full of good courage fights with zeal and spirit,
it is seldom necessary for the chief to show great energy of purpose
in the pursuit of his object. But, as soon as difficulties arise
-- and that must always happen when great results are at stake --
then things no longer move on of themselves like a well-oiled machine,
the machine itself then begins to offer resistance, and to overcome
this, the commander must have a great force of will. By this resistance,
we must not exactly suppose disobedience and murmurs, although these
are frequent enough with particular individuals; it is the whole
feeling of the dissolution of all physical and moral power, it is
the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice which the commander
has to contend with in himself, and then, in all others who directly
or indirectly transfer to him their impressions, feelings, anxieties
and desires. As the forces in one individual after another become
prostrated, and can no longer be excited and supported by an effort
of his own will, the whole inertia of the mass gradually rests its
weight on the will of the commander: by the spark in his breast,
by the light of his spirit, the spark of purposes, the light of
hope must be kindled afresh in others
Of all the noble feelings which fill the human heart in the exciting
tumult of battle, none, we must admit, are so powerful and constant
as the soul's thirst for honor and renown
No doubt it is just
in war that the abuse of these proud aspirations of the soul must
bring upon the human race the most shocking outrages; but by their
origin, they are certainly to be counted amongst the noblest feelings
which belong to human nature, and in war they are the vivifying
principle which gives the enormous body a spirit.
... It is through these aspirations we have been speaking
of in commanders, from the highest to the lowest, this sort of energy,
this spirit of emulation, these incentives, that the action of armies
is chiefly animated and made successful. And now as to that which
specially concerns the head of all, we ask, Has there ever been
a great commander destitute of the love of honor, or is such a character
even conceivable?
If we now turn to strength of mind or soul, then the first question
is, What are we to understand thereby?
Plainly, it is not vehement expressions of feeling, nor easily excited
passions, for that would be contrary to all the usage of language;
but the power of listening to reason in the midst of the most intense
excitement, in the storm of the most violent passions. Should this
power depend on strength of understanding alone? We doubt it. The
fact that there are men of the greatest intellect who cannot command
themselves, certainly proves nothing to the contrary; for we might
say that it perhaps requires an understanding of a powerful rather
than of a comprehensive nature: but we believe we shall be nearer
the truth if we assume that the power of submitting oneself to the
control of the understanding, even in moments of the most violent
excitement of the feelings, that power which we call self-command,
has its root in the heart itself. It is, in point of fact, another
feeling, which, in strong minds balances the excited passions without
destroying them; and it is only through this equilibrium that the
mastery of the understanding is secured. This counterpoise is nothing
but a sense of the dignity of man, that noblest pride, that deeply
seated desire of the soul, always to act as a being endued with
understanding and reason. We may, therefore, say that a strong mind
is one which does not lose its balance even under the most violent
excitement.
Now in war, owing to the many and powerful impressions to which
the mind is exposed, and, in the uncertainty of all knowledge and
of all science, more things occur to distract a man from the road
he has entered upon, to make him doubt himself and others, than
in any other human activity.
When the discernment is clear and deep, none but general principles
and views of action from a high standpoint can be the result; and
on these principles the opinion in each particular case immediately
under consideration lies, as it were, at anchor...
Certainly one is accustomed to regard the plain honest soldier,
as the very opposite of the man of reflection, full of inventions
and ideas, or of the brilliant spirit shining in the ornaments of
refined education of every kind.
[However], for each station, from the lowest upwards, to render
distinguished services in war, there must be a particular genius.
But the title of genius, history and the judgment of posterity only
confer, in general, on those minds which have shone in the highest
rank, that of commanders-in-chief. The reason is that here, in point
of fact, the demand on the reasoning and intellectual powers, generally,
is much greater.
To conduct a whole war or its great [...] campaigns, to a successful
termination, there must be an intimate knowledge of state [political]
policy in its higher relations. The conduct of the war and the [political]
policy of the State here coincide; and the general becomes, at the
same time, the statesman.
... We say, the general becomes a statesman, but he
must not cease to be the general. He takes into view all the relations
of the State on the one hand; on the other he must know exactly
what he can do with the means at his disposal.
As the diversity and undefined limits of all the circumstances bring
a great number of things into consideration in war, as the most
of these things can only be estimated according to probability,
therefore if the chief of an army does not bring to bear upon all
this a mind with an intuitive perception of the truth, a confusion
of ideas and views must take place, in the midst of which the judgment
will become bewildered. In this sense Napoleon Buonaparte was right
when he said that many of the questions which come before a general
for decision would make problems for a mathematical calculation,
not unworthy of the powers of Newton or Euler.
What is here required from the higher powers of the
mind is a sense of unity, and a judgment raised to such a compass
as to give the mind an extraordinary faculty of vision, which, in
its range, allays and sets aside a thousand dim notions which an
ordinary understanding could only bring to light with great effort,
and over which it would exhaust itself. But this higher activity
of the mind, this glance of genius would still not become matter
of history if the qualities of temperament and character of which
we have treated did not give it their support.
Truth alone is but a weak motive of action with men, and hence there
is always a great difference between knowing and willing, between
science and art. The man receives the strongest impulse to action
through the feelings, and the most powerful succor, if we may use
the expression, through those mixtures of heart and mind, which
we have made acquaintance with, as resolution, firmness, perseverance,
and force of character.
If, however, this elevated condition of heart and mind in the General
did not manifest itself in the general effects resulting from it,
and could only be accepted on trust and faith, then it would rarely
become matter of history.
All that becomes known of the course of events in war is usually
very simple, has a great sameness in appearance; no one on the mere
relation of such events perceives the difficulties connected with
them which had to be overcome. It is only now and again in the memoirs
of Generals, or of those in their confidence, or by reason of some
special historical inquiry directed to a particular circumstance
that a portion of the many threads composing the whole web is brought
to light. The reflections, mental doubts and conflicts which precede
the execution of great acts are purposely concealed because they
affect political interests, or the recollection of them is accidentally
lost because they have been looked upon as mere scaffolding which
had to be removed on the completion of the building.
If, now, in conclusion, without venturing upon a closer definition
of the higher powers of the soul, we should admit a distinction
in the intelligent faculties themselves according to the common
ideas established by language, and ask ourselves what kind of mind
comes closest to military genius? then a look at the subject as
well as at experience will tell us that searching rather than inventive
minds, comprehensive minds rather than such as have a special bent,
cool rather than fiery heads are those to which in time of war we
should prefer to trust the welfare of our brothers and children,
the honor and the safety of our fatherland.
|