On Magnanimity

from the

Nicomachean Ethics

by Aristotle


The following selection comes from Book IV of Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle is discussing individual virtues as different means between extremes. He has previously discussed such virtues as courage, moderation, and liberality, and will proceed to discuss justice in Book V and the intellectual virtues in Book VI. In Book I, he defined happiness, which is the good that all human beings pursue, as the virtuous activity of the soul.


Magnanimity (literally, "greatness of soul") seems even from its name to be concerned with great things. What sort of great things is the first question we must try to answer. It makes no difference whether we consider the state of character or the individual characterized by it.

Now one is thought to be magnanimous who thinks himself worthy of great things, when he is worthy of them. He who does so beyond his deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is foolish or silly. The magnanimous person, then, is the one we have described. For he who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy of little is moderate, but not magnanimous; for magnanimity implies greatness, as beauty of body implies size. Small people may be neat and well-proportioned but cannot be beautiful.

On the other hand, he who thinks himself worthy of great things, being unworthy of them, is vain; though not every one who thinks himself worthy of more than he really is worthy of is vain. The one who thinks himself worthy of less than he is really worthy of is small-souled, whether his deserts be great or moderate, or his deserts be small but his claims yet smaller. And the man whose deserts are great would seem most small-souled; for what would he have done if they had been less?

The magnanimous person, then, is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness of them; for he claims what is accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall short.

If, then, he deserves and claims great things, and indeed the greatest things, he will be concerned with one thing in particular. Desert is relative to external goods; and the greatest of these, we should say, is that which we render to the gods, and which people of position most aim at, and which is the prize appointed for the noblest deeds. This is honor; which is surely the greatest of external goods. The magnanimous individual is therefore the one who has the right disposition with respect to honors and dishonors. And even apart from argument it is with honor that the magnanimous appear to be concerned; for it is honor that they chiefly claim, but in accordance with their deserts.

The small-souled individual falls short both in comparison with his own merits and in comparison with the magnanimous individual's claims. The vain person goes to excess in comparison with his own merits, but does not exceed the magnanimous individual's claims.

Now the magnanimous individual, since he deserves most, must be good in the highest degree; for the better always deserves more, and the best the most. Therefore the truly magnanimous individual must be good. And greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a magnanimous individual. And it would be most unbecoming for a magnanimous person to fly from danger, swinging his arms by his sides, or to wrong another; for to what end should he do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is great?

If we consider him point by point we shall see the utter absurdity of a magnanimous person who is not good. Nor, again, would he be worthy of honor if he were bad; for honor is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered. Magnanimity, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it is not found without them. Therefore it is hard to be truly magnanimous; for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character.

It is chiefly with honors and dishonors, then, that the magnanimous person is concerned; and at honors that are great and conferred by good people he will be moderately pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own or even less than his own; for there can be no honor that is worthy of perfect virtue, yet he will at any rate accept it since they have nothing greater to bestow on him. Honor from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise, since it is not this that he deserves. He will also despise dishonor, since in his case it cannot be just.

In the first place, then, as has been said, the magnanimous individual is concerned with honors; yet he will also bear himself with due measure towards wealth and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither over-joyed by good fortune nor over-pained by evil. For not even towards honor does he bear himself as if it were a very great thing. Power and wealth are desirable for the sake of honor (at least those who have them wish to get honor by means of them); and for him to whom even honor is a little thing the others must be so too. Hence magnanimous persons are thought to be disdainful.

The goods of fortune also are thought to contribute towards magnanimity. For those who are well-born are thought worthy of honor, and so are those who enjoy power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a superiority in something good is held in greater honor. Hence even such things make individuals more magnanimous; for they are honored by some for having them; but in truth the good individual alone is to be honored; he, however, who has both advantages is thought the more worthy of honor. But those who without virtue have such goods are neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to the name of "magnanimous"; for these things imply perfect virtue. Those who have such goods without virtue become disdainful and insolent. For without virtue it is not easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune; and, being unable to bear them, and thinking themselves superior to others, they despise others and themselves do what they please. They imitate the magnanimous individual without being like him, and this they do where they can; so they do not act virtuously, but they do despise others. For the magnanimous individual despises justly (since he thinks truly), but the many do so at random.

He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger, because he honors few things; but he will face great dangers, and when he is in danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that there are conditions on which life is not worth having. And he is the sort of person to confer benefits, but he is ashamed of receiving them; for the one is the mark of a superior, the other of an inferior. And he is apt to confer greater benefits in return; for thus the original benefactor besides being paid will incur a debt to him, and will be the gainer by the transaction.

Magnanimous people seem also to remember any service they have done, but not those they have received (for he who receives a service is inferior to him who has done it, but the magnanimous person wishes to be superior), and to hear of the former with pleasure, of the latter with displeasure; this, it seems, is why Thetis did not mention to Zeus the services she had done him, and why the Spartans did not recount their services to the Athenians, but those they had received.

It is a mark of the magnanimous person also to ask for nothing or scarcely anything, but to give help readily, and to be dignified towards people who enjoy high position and good fortune, but unassuming towards those of the middle class; for it is a difficult and lofty thing to be superior to the former, but easy to be so to the latter, and a lofty bearing over the former is no mark of ill-breeding, but among humble people it is as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak.

Again, it is characteristic of the magnanimous person not to aim at the things commonly held in honor, or the things in which others excel; to be sluggish and to hold back except where great honor or a great work is at stake, and to be a person of few deeds, but of great and notable ones.

He must also be open in his hate and in his love (for to conceal one's feelings, i.e. to care less for truth than for what people will think, is a coward's part), and must speak and act openly; for he is free of speech because he is contemptuous, and he is given to telling the truth, except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar.

He must be unable to make his life revolve round another, unless it be a friend; for this is slavish, and for this reason all flatterers are servile and people lacking in self-respect are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration; for nothing to him is great.

Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not the part of a magnanimous person to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather to overlook them. Nor is he a gossip; for he will speak neither about himself nor about another, since he cares not to be praised nor for others to be blamed; nor again is he given to praise; and for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker, even about his enemies, except from haughtiness. With regard to necessary or small matters he is least of all me given to lamentation or the asking of favors; for it is the part of one who takes such matters seriously to behave so with respect to them.

He is one who will possess beautiful and profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones; for this is more proper to a character that is self-sufficient.

Further, a slow step is thought proper to the magnanimous individual, a deep voice, and a level utterance; for the one who takes few things seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor the one who thinks nothing great to be excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry and excitement.
Such, then, is the magnanimous person; the one who falls short of him is small-souled, and the one who goes beyond him is vain. Now even these are not thought to be bad (for they are not malicious), but only mistaken. For those of small soul, being worthy of good things, robs himself of what he deserves, and to have something bad about him from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of good things, and seems also not to know himself; else he would have desired the things he was worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are not thought to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. Such a reputation, however, seems actually to make them worse; for each class of people aims at what corresponds to its worth, and these people stand back even from noble actions and undertakings, deeming themselves unworthy, and from external goods no less.

Vain people, on the other hand, are fools and ignorant of themselves, and that manifestly; for, not being worthy of them, they attempt honorable undertakings, and then are found out; and they adorn themselves with clothing and outward show and such things, and wish their strokes of good fortune to be made public, and speak about them as if they would be honored for them.

But smallness of soul is more opposed to magnanimity than vanity is; for it is both commoner and worse.

Magnanimity, then, is concerned with honor on the grand scale, as has been said.

Aristotle Questions

Guide to unit 2

back to unit 2

 

 

| HOME | OVERVIEW|